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Abstract. 
 
In the context of certain general equilibrium search models, it is possible to infer the elasticity of 
labor supply to the firm from the elasticity of the quit rate with respect to the wage.  We use this 
framework to estimate the elasticity of labor supply for men and women workers at a chain of 
grocery stores operating in the southwestern United States, identifying separation elasticities 
from differences in wages and separation rates across different job titles within the firm.  We 
estimate elasticities of labor supply to the firm of about 2.7 for men and about 1.5 for women, 
suggesting significant wage-setting power for the firm.  Since women have lower elasticities of 
labor supply to the firm, a Robinson-style monopsony model might explain lower relative pay of 
women in the grocery industry.  The wage gaps we observe among workers in US retail grocery 
stores are close to what the monopsony model predicts for the elasticities we have estimated. 
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I.   Introduction 
  In one of the earliest explanations of the “gender gap” in wages, Joan Robinson (1969, 
pp. 224-27) showed that if an employer is a monopsonist and the elasticities of labor supply of 
equally productive men and women differ, it is profitable for employers to engage in wage 
discrimination, paying higher wages to the group with the higher  elasticity of supply.   Although 
Robinson’s model appears in many economics textbooks, the discussion of it is usually skeptical, 
as it is based on the assumption of a pure monopsony--a single employer of labor in a market--
and this seems at odds with the marketplace that we observe almost everywhere.  Perhaps for this 
reason, models of monopsony have not been very influential in the economics literature on labor 
market discrimination in the past forty years. Following Becker (1971), much of this literature 
has focused primarily on explaining how discriminatory wage differences could occur in 
competitive markets. 
  However, some recent models suggest that employers may have market power, even 
when there are numerous employers in the market.  In fact, this is not an entirely new idea.  
Samuelson (1958) in an early edition of his principles textbook noted the following about the 
wage policies of companies: 
  “… In a perfectly competitive market, a firm need not make decisions on its pay schedules; 
instead it would turn to the morning newspaper to learn what its wage policy would have to be.  
Any firm, by raising wages ever so little, could get all the extra help it wanted.  If, on the other 
hand, it cut the wage ever so little, it would find no labor to hire at all in a perfectly competitive 
labor market. 
   “... The world … is a blend of (1) competition, and (2) some degree of monopoly power 
over the wage to be paid.  If you try to set your wage too low, you will soon learn this.  At first 
nothing much need happen; but eventually you will find your workers quitting a little more 
rapidly than would otherwise be the case.  Recruitment of new people of the same quality will 
get harder and harder …” 
 
  One interpretation of the ideas expressed in these paragraphs has been formalized 
cleverly in general equilibrium search models of the kind proposed by Burdett and Mortensen  
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(1998).  In these types of models, individual firms, although “small” with respect to the labor 
market, face labor supply curves that slope upward in exactly the way that Samuelson described.  
The implications of this model for labor market monopsony have been explored in a recent book 
by Manning (2003).  Boal and Ransom (1997) refer to these and related models as “dynamic 
monopsony,” because they stress the dynamic nature of the labor market.  Essentially, the 
models formalize the idea that labor market frictions can have an important impact on the 
operation of the market.   
An implication of these models is that the labor supply curve to the firm is related to its 
wage elasticity of separations.  In this paper, we use this relationship as a framework within 
which to estimate the labor supply curve to an individual firm (a retail grocer), taking advantage 
of the differences in wages and separation rates across different job titles.  We find that the 
elasticity of labor supply to the firm does differ between men and women employees, and that 
this difference is consistent with profit-maximizing discrimination against women workers.  
While the observed gender wage gap among workers in the retail grocery industry in the US is 
roughly consistent with the elasticities that we estimate, we suggest that the observed gap should 
be smaller if labor market monopsony is the only source of wage differences, since there are 




  Consider a simple dynamic model of monopsony.  The firm’s employment in the current 
period depends on employment during the preceding period and the wage offered in the 
following way: 
 
    𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡 = [1 − 𝑠𝑠(𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡)]𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝑅𝑅(𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡), 
                                                 
1 In the following discussion, we closely follow parts of the presentation by Manning (2003, Chapter 2).    
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where s(w) is the separation rate and R(w) is the recruitment rate.  In a long run equilibrium, the 
size of the firm is constant so total separation must equal total recruits.  Thus, 
      𝑠𝑠(𝑤𝑤)𝑁𝑁(𝑤𝑤) = 𝑅𝑅(𝑤𝑤), or 
    (1)  𝑁𝑁(𝑤𝑤) = 𝑅𝑅(𝑤𝑤)/𝑠𝑠(𝑤𝑤) 
In elasticity form, this relationship can be written as: 
(2)   𝜀𝜀𝑁𝑁𝑤𝑤 = 𝜀𝜀𝑅𝑅𝑤𝑤 − 𝜀𝜀𝑠𝑠𝑤𝑤. 
It is our intention to estimate a model of labor supply to the firm using this dynamic 
relationship.  However, the employer that we study is clearly not a monopsonist, but interacts 
with many employers in a large labor market.  At least two recent theoretical approaches to 
modeling the labor market describe ways by which “small” employers may wield monopsony 
power.  Bhaskar and To (1999) develop a model of monopsonistic competition.  In their model, 
heterogeneous workers have preferences across non-wage characteristics of jobs, giving each 
employer some market power.  Another approach is the general equilibrium search model of 
Burdett and Mortensen (1998), where market power accrues to employers because of search 
frictions. 
  In the Burdett-Mortensen model, currently employed workers constantly search for jobs.
2
  The Burdett-Mortensen model provides two important results for our purposes.  First, it 
  
As job offers arrive, an employee leaves his current employer if offered a higher wage.  If an 
employer were to increase the offered wage, the rate at which employees leave would fall and 
recruiting success would increase, leading to a larger work force.  In equilibrium, the flow of 
recruits to the firm just balances the flow of those who leave, and this defines the labor supply to 
the firm in exactly the way described by equations (1) and (2) above.   
                                                 
2 Unemployed workers also search for jobs, but in the simplest versions of their model an unemployed worker 
accepts any job that is offered, regardless of the wage.     
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gives a consistent theoretical framework that supports the idea that a firm may have power to set 
wages in the labor market, even in markets with many employers.  The second result greatly 
simplifies our approach to estimating the labor supply to the firm.  In their model, firms recruit 
employees from other employers whose wages are lower.  So the recruit of one employer is the 
separation of another.  Thus, the recruitment elasticity is simply the negative of the separation 
elasticity.  [See Manning (2003, p. 97) for a formal derivation of the result.]  Therefore, the 
elasticity of labor supply to the firm can be written as: 
(3)   𝜀𝜀𝑁𝑁𝑤𝑤 = 𝜀𝜀𝑅𝑅𝑤𝑤 − 𝜀𝜀𝑠𝑠𝑤𝑤 = −2𝜀𝜀𝑠𝑠𝑤𝑤. 
This makes it possible to estimate the firm’s labor supply elasticity only from information on the 
firm’s separations, a much clearer problem than estimating the elasticity of recruits with respect 
to the wage. 
Clearly, the Burdett-Mortensen model is very abstract and fails to describe many 
important facts of the labor market.  Still, generalizations such as Mortensen (2003) or 
Bontemps, Robin and Van den Berg (1999) maintain much of the monopsonistic flavor of the 
original while providing more useful explanations of labor market phenomena.  Nevertheless, 
some have argued that it is inappropriate to adopt this as a description of the labor market.  For 
example, Kuhn (2004) offers several thoughtful criticisms.     
In our work we estimate the elasticity of labor supply to the firm simply by estimating the 
elasticity of the separation rate with respect to the wage, as in equation (3).  The Burdett-
Mortensen model provides a formal justification for the approach.  However, while the Burdett-
Mortensen model is sufficient, it is not strictly necessary.  Our empirical approach really only 
depends on two results:  first, that the dynamic labor supply to the firm may be upward sloping; 
second, that the separation elasticity is the negative of the recruitment elasticity.  The first might  
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be justified by other models, Bhaskar and To (1999) being one example.  The second, however, 
depends on the notion that one firm’s separations are the recruits of another firm, which is 
clearly not strictly true.  See Manning (2003, pp. 96-105) for a discussion and extensions that 
examine the impact of allowing the recruitment of non-employed and separations to non-
employment to be sensitive to the wage, as well.  Unfortunately, the more sophisticated models 
he suggests require much more detailed data than are available to us.   
Nevertheless, the Burdett-Mortensen-Manning framework does provide the insight that 
there is a link between the recruitment and the separation elasticities, since a substantial portion 
of recruits does come from other employment.   Furthermore, there is intuitive appeal in the idea 
that recruiting is approximately as responsive to changes in the wage as is retention.  Still, our 
results should be thought of as an approximation. 
 
III. The Firm 
  The data we analyze come from a regional grocery retailer in the southwestern United 
States.  We have year-end employment and wage data for the retail employees of the firm 
between 1976 and 1986.  (By retail employees, we mean those who worked in the retail 
operations of the grocery stores themselves.  Accountants, company officers, truck drivers, and 
the like, are not included in our analysis.)   
  Table 1 summarizes a few of the characteristics of the firm during the time period that we 
analyze.  The firm operated between 54 and 61 stores, and had between about 1500 and 2000 
retail employees.  The number of stores and employees fluctuated somewhat, increasing early, 
then declining.  During this period the firm opened several new stores and closed several old 
ones.  Many of the company’s retail employees worked part time, with the prevalence of part- 
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time work increasing noticeably over the period of our analysis.  About 40 percent of employees 
were female, and this fraction remained fairly constant. 
  Figure 1 presents a simple organizational chart for employees of the company’s retail 
operations.  Each store had up to three salaried “management” positions: the store manager, the 
assistant manager, and the relief manager.  Other workers were paid on an hourly basis.  The 
largest group of these workers held the title of Food Clerk. Food Clerk assignments included 
stocking shelves and operating cash registers.  Produce Clerks had the same pay scale as food 
clerks but worked in the produce department.  Variety Clerks stocked shelves in the non-foods 
department, but earned less than food clerks.  A few of the stores also had a bakery department, 
where Bakery Sales Workers were employed.  (There were apparently no actual bakers 
employed at these stores.)    Courtesy Clerks bagged and carried groceries for customers.  The 
produce and meat departments had “managers” who received a pay premium but were part of 
their respective bargaining units.  The Night Crew Chief supervised stocking operations during 
the hours the stores were closed, and also received premium wages.   
  All non-management retail employees (including the department “managers”) were 
covered by collective bargaining agreements.  One contract covered the meat department 
employees, and another covered the other employees.  We have examined the contract of one of 
the local unions, which was affiliated with the United Food & Commercial Workers Union.  This 
was a multi-employer agreement that included several other large grocery chains in the region.  
Basically, the contract dictated pay, hours scheduling, benefits and working conditions.  The 
contract specified the wage levels for each of the job titles at the store, including seniority 
increments.  Table 2 shows the contracted wage schedules for Food Clerks, Variety Clerks and 
Courtesy Clerks as of December 28, 1980.  Similar schedules applied to other dates during the  
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period of our analysis.  Other jobs, such as Bakery Sales Worker, Produce Manager, and Night 
Crew Chief are not mentioned in the contract schedule, but wages for those jobs appear to be tied 
to the wage scale of food clerks.     
  Table 3 reports the average wage for workers within each job title as of December 31, 
1980 (i. e., at the beginning of 1981), along with the separation rate for that job title during the 
year.  The logarithm of the separation rate is plotted against the logarithm of the average wage in 
Figure 2.  The figure clearly demonstrates the strong negative correlation between the average 
wage of the job title and the separation rate for workers who began the year in that job.  
Essentially, this correlation is the empirical basis of our analysis that follows. 
In another paper, we examine job mobility within the store and its implications for pay 
differentials between men and women (Ransom and Oaxaca, 2005).  That paper also provides 
more details about the organization of employment within the store.  It is clear that some meat 
department employees had special skills.  However, the other employees were, apparently, 
mostly trained on the job, although provisions of the contract allowed for workers with previous 
experience as grocery store clerks to receive seniority credit for that experience.  According to a 
supplementary survey of a small sample of employees, most employees were high school 
graduates with little or no college training.  Analysis of that sample showed that formal 
educational credentials were unimportant in determining job placement and promotion. 
  In the early 1980s, several women initiated a class-action lawsuit, alleging that the 
employer had discriminated against women in job assignment (particularly in promotion to 
management), and in part-time/full-time work assignments.  The court found the defendant guilty 
of discrimination in 1984, and the two parties reach a negotiated settlement in mid-1986 on terms 
of backpay and affirmative relief.  However, the relief outlined in the settlement did not take  
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place during the period of our analysis.  Nevertheless, we might expect that the lawsuit itself may 
have had some impact on employment practices at the firm and perhaps upon the way that 
women viewed their workplace and employer. 
 
IV.  Data 
  The data we use come from year-end payroll files of the firm.  These data include the 
wage and job title of the employee’s current job, earnings for the past year, date of hire and date 
of birth.  Each year-end file contains a record of all employees who worked for the firm during 
the year, even though they may have terminated their employment before the end of the year.  By 
matching consecutive years, we can identify those who stopped working for the firm during a 
given year.  We have pooled workers for all years between 1977 and 1985.  (We lose the first 
and last year because we cannot identify separation dates from the year-end files directly.)  
According to our definition, a separation occurred in year t if someone was employed at the end 
of year t-1, and was no longer employed at the end of year t.  We do not know the reason for the 
separation.  We assume that virtually all of these are quits, but surely, some would have been 
dismissals, retirements, or the like.  
  We analyze two time periods.  First, we use the entire sample of nine years.  Next, we use 
a shorter sample of 6 years, from 1977 through 1982, since we have some concerns about how 
the lawsuit influenced employment practices.  Table 4 presents summary statistics for the data 
we use in our analysis.  The turnover rate over this period was fairly high–about 16 percent of 
the workforce left the employer each year, on average.  Most of the variables appear to be quite 
similar across time periods used in the analysis. 
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V.  Estimation of the Elasticity of Labor Supply to the Firm 
In order to infer the labor supply elasticities to the firm, we must first estimate the 
elasticity of the separation rate with respect to the wage.  This can be calculated from a probit 
regression model of the form: 
(7)  sit = Φ(α0 + α1 ln(wit) + XitB) = Φ(Iit) 
where sit  is the probability that an individual separates from the firm during the year, Φ(Iit) is the 
normal cumulative distribution function evaluated at Iit, wit is the real wage at the start of the 
year, and X represents a vector of other explanatory variables.  We treat the wages of workers as 
fixed, since they are exogenously determined by a set of contractual rules that are beyond the 
control of the employer and the worker.  We estimate this equation separately for men and 
women employees. 
  We have estimated two versions of this model for each of the sample periods.  Model I 
includes powers of age as the “other” explanatory variables.  Age is included to capture 
differences in labor market experience, which might reflect differences in the skills of the 
workers.  Model II additionally includes tenure with the firm and its square along with a set of 
indicator variables for each year.  It is not clear that tenure ought to be included in a model of 
separations, but since some promotion and job assignment decisions may be based on seniority, 
we include these here.
3
Tables 5a and 5b reports the results of our estimation for the two different time periods 
  The coefficient that we are most interested in changes very little across 
the different specifications of the model.   
                                                 
 
3One alternative model of separations is a matching model in which those who find a 
good match at the firm stay with the firm, while those who do not will leave the firm quickly.  If 
there is a seniority component to the wage, then this would appear to make separations sensitive 
to the wage, when in fact they are not.  However, our estimates of the separation elasticities are 
not very sensitive to whether tenure is included in the model.  
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that we analyze.  Most of the variables are strongly related to the separation probabilities.  The 
age variable enters as a cubic, but over the range from about 20 years old to 50 years old, the 
probability of separation decreases with age, as expected.  The tenure variable enters as a 
quadratic.  The probability of separation decreases with tenure for the first 15 or 20 years 
(depending on version and sample period), then it increases with tenure.  The most visible 
difference between the two specifications is that the coefficient on the log of the wage drops for 
women while it increases slightly for men.  This results in much different elasticity estimates for 
women using the two periods.  We do not have a good explanation for this, although the 
expectations of women at the firm may have changed as a result of the lawsuit. 
The separation elasticities can be calculated from the estimates of equation (7) in the 
following way: 
(8)       )
) (
) (
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where I is the value of the index function that is estimated in the probit regression.  In our 
specification of the separation rate function, the separation rate elasticity is proportional to the 
hazard rate (Inverse Mill’s Ratio). 
  In the context of our version of the Burdett/Mortensen/Manning model, the elasticity of 
labor supply to the firm is simply twice the negative of the separation elasticity, as derived in 
equation (6).  However, because of the nonlinearity of the probit regression model, there is some 
ambiguity as to how to calculate “the” elasticity of labor supply to the firm.  We adopt two 
approaches that are often used to evaluate the results of probit regressions.  In the first, Method 
A, we evaluate the elasticity at the sample mean of the explanatory variables.  That is, we 
evaluate the index function, I, using for the explanatory variables their overall sample means.  
The top panel of Table 6 reports the results of method A.  The second method (Method B)  
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evaluates the elasticity for each individual in the sample, then averages those individual 
estimates for men and women.  The lower panel of Table 6 reports results using this method.  
Both methods yield almost identical results for estimated elasticities. 
  The monopsony model of wage discrimination provides predictions of male/female wage 
differences, under the assumption that the firm is otherwise unconstrained.  If we express the 






j j w MLC
ε
+ = . 
The employer maximizes profits by setting MLCf  equal to MLCm, so 




Nw f w w ε ε + = + , 
and therefore the ratio of female to male wages is 




Nw m f w w ε ε + + = .   
The logarithm of this ratio corresponds to the estimated log wage gap of ln(wf) - ln(wm).  The 
wage ratio and the log wage gap are also reported in Table 6.
4
  The usual measure of monopsony power is called Pigou’s exploitation index.  It is 
defined as 
  Our estimates suggest that a wage 
difference of between 9 and 20 percent would arise if an employer in this market were able to 
take full monopsonistic advantage of the differences in labor supply elasticities between men and 
women. 
                                                 
4 We note in passing that the log wage gap is approximately the difference between the 
exploitation indexes.  From (11) above,  








Nw m f E E w w − = − ≈ + − + = − ε ε ε ε / 1 / 1 ) / 1 1 ln( ) / 1 1 ln( ) ln( ) ln( , 
if the exploitation is small (or the elasticity of labor supply to the firm is large).  This 
approximation is not very accurate for our particular example, however, as our estimated 
elasticities are quite small.  
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where MRPL is the marginal revenue product of labor.  E measures the percentage deviation of 
the market value of the worker’s output from his or her wage.  (This corresponds directly to the 
Lerner index used to measure monopoly power.)  As shown by Boal and Ransom (1997) and 
others, this is just the inverse of the labor supply elasticity to the firm if the employer sets wages 
to maximize profits.  Our estimates indicate that this firm has substantial potential market 
power—values of E are around 0.4 for men and almost 0.6 for women. 
 
VI.    Can Monopsony Explain the Gender Wage Gap? 
  We do not interpret our estimates to imply that the wages we observe at this firm would 
increase by 40 to 60 percent if market frictions suddenly disappeared.  This firm is obviously 
constrained in wage setting—its wage making power is tempered by the bargaining power of its 
workers and their unions.  In fact, in a sense the firm has little ability to change the wages at all; 
wages for each job title are fixed by contract, something that we explicitly note in our estimation 
procedure, which treats theses wages as exogenously determined.  The firm faces an upward 
sloping labor supply curve—it has market power due to market frictions—but it is unable to take 
full advantage of it because of the institutions and environment in which it operates. 
  Similarly, we cannot look to monopsonistic discrimination as a source of gender 
differences in pay at this firm, since wages in each job are fixed.  If all jobs are filled, then it 
does not matter to the employer whether a particular job is filled by a woman or a man—the total 
wage bill will be the same, although perhaps the firm could increase employment in the bakery at 
the expense of grocery operations to take advantage of lower wages.  Thus it is more accurate to 
talk of the elasticity that we estimate as a “notional” or potential elasticity—the labor supply  
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elasticity that the firm would face in the absence of labor market institutions like unions.
5 
  So the labor supply elasticity we have estimated does not permit us to say much about 
how wages are determined at this firm.  However, we can think of this firm as a typical
  To examine this question, we estimate gender wage differences among a broad sample of 
workers in grocery stores, using data from the Current Population Survey.  We combine samples 
from the Merged Outgoing Rotation Groups from 1979 through 1982 and select individuals who 
work in the retail grocery industry and are paid on an hourly basis.  Table 7 reports our results.  
From a national sample of slightly less than 15,000 workers, we estimate a disadvantage in pay 
for women of about 24 percent.  If we restrict our analysis to only those workers who lived in the 
southwest region (California, Arizona, Nevada and Utah), the estimate is about 20 percent--
virtually the same value predicted by our estimates for the “early” sample.   
 firm in 
this labor market.  Thus, other firms that operate in the same labor market face the same labor 
supply curve.  So we expect that other grocery stores (and perhaps employers in other industries 
who tap the same market) have similar levels of market power. 
  We think of our estimate of the exploitation index as a measure of potential market 
power of firms. This power to set wages is surely tempered by legal and institutional factors.  For 
example, in this industry in this period of time, unionization is fairly common.  Also, minimum 
wage laws probably have some impact on wage setting for this market, as well.  Nevertheless, to 
the extent that the institutional and legal constraints on firms’ exercise of potential monopsony 
power are approximately the same for men and women in this industry, the predicted gender 
wage gap may be a good approximation of how even partial exercise of monopsony power 
                                                 
5   In fact, women at this firm do receive lower wages than men with similar age and 
experience.  Ransom and Oaxaca (2005) show that this is due to the assignment of women to 
lower paying jobs in the firm than similarly qualified men.  They estimate that women were 
underpaid in 1982 by about 8 percent compared to similar men. 
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contributes to gender wage differentials. The close consistency of the predicted gender wage gap 
from the monopsony model with independent estimates of the gender wage gap supports the idea 
monopsonistic discrimination may be one reason for the wage differences between men and 
women in this industry. 
 
VII.  Discussion 
  While our objective here has been to estimate an elasticity of labor supply to the firm, to 
do that we have, in fact, estimated the elasticity of the quit rate with respect to the wage.  There 
is a substantial empirical literature on quit rates, with early influential papers by Parsons (1972) 
and Pencavel (1972), for example.  More specifically, other papers have also examined 
differences in quit rates between men and women, such as Blau and Kahn (1981), Viscusi (1980 
or Meitzen (1986).  However, much of the literature is not concerned with how the quit rate 
responds to wages, and in those papers where an elasticity-like coefficient is estimated, it is 
difficult to compare those rates directly with the ones that we have estimated here.  The previous 
work that is most directly comparable to ours is Hirsch, Schank and Schnabel (2006).  In their 
analysis of German data they, too, find labor supply elasticities to the firm are smaller for women 
than for men.  Barth and Dale-Olsen (1999) also find that the elasticity of turnover with respect 
to the wage is greater for men than for women in a sample of Norwegian workers. 
In the present study, we have taken a very static, “Robinsonian” approach to the 
interpretation of the elasticity of labor supply to the firm, which requires some formal departures 
from the search model that we used to motivate the analysis.  For example, in the Burdett-
Mortensen-Manning (BMM) model, each firm offers a single wage, while our objective is to 
examine within-firm wage differences.  In BMM, productivity is determined by the firm (or  
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perhaps the job) while our regression models, at least in spirit, assume there are productivity 
differences across individuals.   
Our approach is reduced form in nature.  Others have applied more structural models.  
For example, Bowlus (1997) estimates the “primitive” parameters of a generalization of the 
Burdett-Mortensen model using data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth.  She 
argues that gender differences in the parameters of the search model can explain a substantial 
part of the observed difference in wages.
 6   It is interesting to note that in the context of her 
model, there is no discrimination by employers, even though elasticities of labor supply differ by 
sex—each employer offers the same wage to all workers, but the equilibrium wage distribution 
of women has a lower expected value.
7
 
  In the spirit of Bowlus’ approach, wage differences at 
our firm could arise because women “stick” in low wage jobs, while men are more likely to 
move on to higher pay jobs, even without any effort by the employer to take advantage of its 
monopsony position.  (Our approach, on the other hand, stresses conscious wage discrimination 
by the employer.) 
VIII.  Summary and Conclusions 
  In this paper we have estimated the sensitivity of separations to the wage rates offered to 
different employees within a regional grocery chain.  We argue that this provides an estimate of 
the labor supply elasticity for this firm.  Our estimates imply an elasticity of about about 2.5 for 
men and about 1.5 to 1.8 for women.  This indicates that firms have significant potential 
monopsony power, although this monopsony power would likely be tempered by labor market 
                                                 
6 For technical reasons, Bowlus assumes that men and women do not work for the same employer.  That is, 
employers either hire all men or all women. 
7 Mortensen (2003) is an example of an empirical study that examines the monopsony issue within the context of a 
structural equilibrium search model.  However, his paper does not address male/female differences in wages.  
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institutions, like unions, or by labor market regulations.  The difference in the labor supply 
elasticities of men and women suggests a role for monopsony power in explaining male/female 
difference in pay. 
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Selected Years (as of 31 December) 
 
 Year  1977  1980  1982  1985 
Number of Stores  59  61  58  54 
Number of Retail 
Employees  1522  1968  1820  1533 
 
Percent of Employees who 
are Female  37.5  41.2  40.8  41.8 
 
Percent of Employees Part 
Time  42.1  55.1  56.9  62.6 
 
Average Age  32.5  32.2  33.4  34.9 
 
Average Seniority  6.0  5.8  7.1  8.9 
    








































Wage Schedules per Contract 














0-1040 hours  $4.98  0-1040 hours  $4.814  0-520 hours  $3.35 
1041-2080   5.81  1041-2080   5.395  521-1560  3.45 
2081-3120   6.64  Thereafter  6.225  Thereafter  3.60 
Thereafter  8.30  Hired before 1/15/78  7.774   
 
 
*The wages of Courtesy Clerks were tied to the federal minimum wage, which at the time was $3.35.  However, 
many Courtesy Clerks received a student sub-minimum wage of $2.85.   
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Table 3 
Average wages and separation rates by job title,  1981 
 











Meat Manager  9.80  0.21  57  0.088 
Meat Cutter  9.41  0.43  150  0.087 
Meat Wrapper  8.52  0.23  84  0.107 
Produce Manager  8.41  0.34  57  0.088 
Produce Clerk  7.42  1.11  105  0.124 
Night Crew Chief  8.21  0.39  46  0.065 
Food Clerk  7.31  1.16  991  0.117 
Variety Clerk  6.25  0.82  74  0.176 
Bakery Sales Worker  5.51  1.01  16  0.313 
Courtesy Clerk  2.92  0.26  224  0.335 
 
Note:  Average wage is the average wage as of 12/31/1980 of those holding the 
relevant job title.  The separation rate is the fraction of those holding the relevant 
job title on 12/31/80 that had left the firm by 12/31/1981.    




Summary Statistics for Grocery Store Data  
A.  Full Sample (1977-1985) 











         
Separated  0.16  0.37  0.00  1.00 
Age  32.75  12.61  16.04  74.63 
Tenure  6.02  5.81  0.02  3.83 
Female  0.44  0.50  0.00  1.00 
Wage (nominal)  7.34  2.56  1.96  12.47 
Wage (1977 Dollars)  5.04  1.38  1.60  7.10 
 
Fraction of sample from each year 
 
     
   Year 1977  0.095 
         Year 1978  0.095 
         Year 1979  0.104 
         Year 1980  0.120 
         Year 1981  0.125 
         Year 1982  0.126 
         Year 1983  0.115 
         Year 1984  0.111 
         Year 1985  0.108 
       
B.  Early Years (1977-1982) 
Sample Size 9,566 
         
Separated  0.16  0.36  0.00  1.00 
Age   32.17  12.78  16.03  71.63 
Tenure  5.38  5.58  0.03  34.54 
Female  0.43  0.50  0.00  1.00 
Wage (nominal)  6.38  2.05  1.96  10.82 
Wage (1977 Dollars)  4.86  1.33  1.76  6.79 
 
Fraction of Sample from Each  Year 
 
   Year 1977  0.143 
         Year 1978  0.143 
         Year 1979  0.156 
         Year 1980  0.180 
         Year 1981  0.189 
         Year 1982  0.189 
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Table 5a 
Probit Regressions Estimates of Separations 
Full Sample—All Years 
(Standard Errors in Parentheses) 
 




  Female  Male  Female  Male 
Log wage  -0.7360  -0.9071  -0.5480  -0.7570 
  (0.0892)  (0.0686)  (0.0961)  (0.0734) 
Age  0.2460  0.0632  0.2120  0.0556 
  (0.0549)  (0.0517)  (0.0556)  (0.0546) 
Age
2/10  -0.0842  -0.0273  -0.0745  -0.0238 
  (0.0145)  (0.0140)  (0.0147)  (0.0148) 
Age
3/1000  0.0833  0.0302  0.0757  0.0270 
  (0.0121)  (0.0120)  (0.0123)  (0.0127) 
Tenure      -0.0682  -0.059 
      (0.0123)  (0.0109) 
Tenure
2      0.00237  0.0015 
      (0.0005)  (0.0004) 
Year Dummies?  No  No  Yes  Yes 
Constant  -1.948  0.0391  -1.4800  0.2570 
  (0.580)  (0.5203)  (0.591)  (0.557) 
         
N  6320  8058  6320  8058  
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Table 5b 
Probit Regression Estimates of Separations 
Early Sample—1977 to 1982 only 
 
  Model I    Model II 
  Female    Male  Female  Male 
Log wage  -0.616  -0.955    -0.452  -0.845 
  (0.120)  (0.0844)    (0.128)  (0.0909) 
Age  0.239  0.0944    0.220  0.102 
      (0.0672)  (0.0634)    (0.0684)  (0.0660) 
Age
2/10  -0.0813  -0.0354    -0.0755  -0.0360 
      (0.0177)  (0.0173)    (0.0181)  (0.0181) 
Age
3/1000  0.0799  0.0370    0.0754  0.0369 
     (0.0148)  (0.0148)    (0.0151)  (0.0155) 
Tenure        -0.0742  -0.0477 
            (0.0148)  (0.0142) 
Tenure
2        0.00293  0.00141 
             (0.000596)  (0.000571) 
Year 1978        0.0628  -0.108 
             (0.0953)  (0.0782) 
Year 1979        -0.130  -0.203 
             (0.0960)  (0.0792) 
Year 1980        -0.0267  -0.0904 
             (0.0906)  (0.0744) 
Year 1981        -0.104  -0.202 
             (0.0904)  (0.0764) 
Year 1982        0.0659  0.0247 
             (0.0876)  (0.0722) 
Constant  -2.072  -0.300    -1.949  -0.371 
      (0.703)  (0.633)    (0.711)  (0.658) 
Observations  4143  5408    4143  5408 
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Table 6 




















A.  At Mean of Sample 
Characteristics 
     
      Men  2.413    2.669 
      Women  1.793 
 
1.474 














B.  Sample Mean of 
Individualistic Estimates 
 
     
      Men  2.436 
 
2.692 
      Women  1.804 
 
1.482 
















Notes:  Method A evaluates the elasticity of labor supply to the firm at the mean values of the explanatory 
variables.  Method B evaluates the elasticity of labor supply for each individual in the sample, then averages 
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Table 7 
Estimated Gender Gap for Hourly Grocery Store 
Employees in the CPS Merged Outgoing 
Rotation Group Files (1979-1982) 
(Dependent Variable is log wage) 
 
   
COEFFICIENT 
 
All US  Southwest Only 
Female  -0.238  -0.195 
 
(0.00598)  (0.0167) 
Age  0.123  0.154 
 
(0.00468)  (0.0144) 
Age
2  -0.229  -0.296 
 
(0.0124)  (0.0391) 
Age
3  0.0125  0.0169 
 
(0.00101)  (0.00329) 
Education = 12 Years  0.119  0.136 
 
(0.00761)  (0.0239) 
Education = 13-15 years  0.131  0.0943 
 
(0.00871)  (0.0242) 
Education = 16 years  0.138  0.145 
 
(0.0176)  (0.0409) 
Education > 16 years  0.0760  0.128 
 
(0.0382)  (0.0784) 
Year=1980  0.0656  0.0419 
 
(0.00813)  (0.0225) 
Year=1981  0.122  0.103 
 
(0.00822)  (0.0229) 
Year=1982  0.169  0.189 
 
(0.00863)  (0.0242) 
Constant  4.336  4.076 
 
(0.0498)  (0.153) 
Observations  14808  1945 
R-squared  0.324  0.363 
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Figure 1 
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